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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
TiaE CouRT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF DEFENDANT'S EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS
AS A CONFESSION NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
After a conviction in the County Court of Erie County for manslaughter
in the second degree,42 and a subsequent affirmance by the Appellate Division,43
the defendant in People v. Kingston4 4 was granted a permissive appeal. 45
Defendant's sole argument to the Court was based on the trial judge's
charge wherein reference was made to the rule governing the admissibility of a
confession. Defendant argued that the interjection of this rule implied that he
had in fact confessed to the crime as charged and tended to characterize certain
pretrial statements, admittedly made by him, as a confession of guilt in the
eyes of the jury. It was submitted that this was highly prejudicial and
constituted reversible error.
The record showed that defendant's four-year-old foster son had died
of "'shock due to blood loss' resulting from a 'tearing of the mesentery.'"
Medical testimony established that a sharp blow or kick to the stomach or
back could have caused the fatal injury. Defendant's own statements to the
district attorney, both written and oral, vividly recounted his striking and
shoving the child in an attempt to "discipline" him; whereupon, the child fell
against the leg of a bed and shortly thereafter lapsed into a coma, which
resulted in death. The defendant did not, however, acknowledge guilt of the
crime or admit that his punishment was either excessive or the cause of the
child's death.
The Court of Appeals, although recognizing that the trial court's reference
to the rule governing the admissibility of confessions was unnecessary, rejected
the defendant's argument on the basis that it was clear that the judge was
merely "speaking in the abstract and not of the statements given by the
defendant.1 40 The Court reached this conclusion despite "the fact that the
phase of the charge referring to the rule governing the admissibility of a
confession immediately followed the trial judge's express reference to the
defendant's pretrial statements.
In an effort then to strengthen their ultimate result, the Court further held
that "even if the instruction were to be construed as an oblique characterization
of the statements as confessions, that would not constitute prejudicial error.1'47
In any trial some error is inevitable; on review it must be determined whether
the claimed defect influenced the jury and tainted its verdict.48 If it did not,
the verdict must stand.
The Court recognized that the defendant's statements technically would
42. N.Y. Penal Law § 1052.
43. 11 AJ).2d 906, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (4th Dep't 1960).
44. 8 N.Y.2d 384,.208 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1960).
45. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 589.
46. People v. Kingston, supra note 43 at 389, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
47. Ibid.
48. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 542.
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not amount to a confession in that he did not acknowledge his guilt.49 However,
the statements made were highly incriminating by and of themselves and it is
only a fine distinction between the content of those statements and what could
in fact be considered a confession. The Court concludes from this that there
is little chance that the jury was influenced by the Court's characterization, if
such it was, of the defendant's statements as confessions. The test being applied
is that the possibility of prejudice "varies with the degree to which the court's
description of the defendant's statement departs from the fact."50
The defendant relied upon the two cases of People v. Thomas5 ' and People
v. Doria,52 where judgments were reversed because the trial court had
erroneously characterized certain pretrial statements of the defendants as
confessions.
The Thomas case was a per curiam decision which held that, in a
burglary conviction, characterization of exculpatory pretrial statements as a
confession constituted error which deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial
trial, the result having been based on the Doria case. However, reliance on the
holding in People v. Thomas,53 without a full opinion expressing the court's
view of the degree to which the characterization of the statements as a
confession departed from the actual fact, ignores the test as it has developed.
In the Doria54 case, defendant had been tried for rape. He had made
pretrial admissions of indecent familiarities with the complainant, and the
judge had improperly referred to his statements several times as a confession.
This writer feels that the case is distinguishable from the present one in that
the admissions were not for the act complained of and, further, because rape is a
technical charge which the jury must be made to understand has certain
essential elements which must be present for the commission of the crime. To a
layman it might be very easy to equate admitted indecencies with the act of rape
when the judge refers to these admissions as a confession.
A slightly later decision, People v. Lewis,s5 clarified the holding in the
Doria case and denied a new trial for the error here in question. In the words
of that case:
It is true that it is a technical error to characterize an explanatory or
exculpatory statement by an accused as a "confession."... But every
error in a criminal case will not warrant a reversal. . . . The error
must rise to a level where it can reasonably be evaluated as adversely
affecting the result. In People v. Doria we regarded the question of
guilt or innocence of the rape charged as closely balanced; we felt
49. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law p. 152, note 89 (1961). Accordingly the term
'confession' excludes- exculpatory statements and in general all statements, declarations and
admissions by work or act, which do not amount to an acknowledgment of guilt.
50. People v. Kingston, supra note 44 at 390, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
51. 283 App. Div. 995, 130 N.Y.S.2d 292 (4th Dep't 1954).
52. 281 App. Div. 918, 119 N.Y.S.2d 691 (3d Dep't 1953).
53. Supra note 51.
54. Supra note 52.
55. 282 App. Div. 267, 123 N.Y.S.2d 81 (3d Dep't 1953).
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the error in the context of that record of sufficient gravity to warrant
a new trial.
But it can scarcely be argued that every time a judge in his
charge calls a pretrial statement a "confession" there must be a
reversal without regard to the course and direction of the record as a
whole.5" (Emphasis added, Citations omitted.)
Another Appellate Division case, People v. Lee,5 7 again emphasized that
this improper designation of pretrial statements is only important in its overall
impression on the jury by the following statement:
We do not think that the jurors were misled by the use of the word
"confessions" in the charge or that their minds were not clearly directed
to the true issues involved ... or that the verdict was against the law
or that justice requires a new trial. .... 58
That case, involving murder in the first degree, was affirmed. 59 However,
the dissenting opinion in the instant case argues that Lee is distinguishable
because an exception was not taken by the trial counsel to the designation of
the admissions as confessions. To the writer it is impossible to believe that
this Court was controlled in its determination by this minor technical point,
especially in a situation wherein the crime charged was murder and the penalty
death.
The Court holds here that the error did not influence the verdict, thereby
affirming the Appellate Division's denial of a new trial
Chief Judge Desmond, dissenting, views the error as highly prejudicial,
for "with the issue of guilt so close, this was a dire blow to the defense and an
error most grave."60 This writer cannot agree with the interpretation Judge
Desmond gives to the record. If the case is viewed as a close one, an error such
as this would certainly be a highly prejudicial and reversible error in that the
jury might well be swayed by the fact that the defendant had confessed to the
crime. But here we have the defendant's own account of what had transpired,
an admission that he had administered a severe beating to a four-year-old
child. The account itself was highly incriminating and the defendant's own
words must have had a tremendous impact on the jury. It is difficult for this
writer to believe that a jury would not consider these statements as tantamount
to an admission of guilt however they were labeled by the trial judge.
P.C. B.
WITHDRAWN GUILTY PLEA NOT ADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PuRPosE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
The long standing rule in New York has been that although a trial court
may in its discretion allow a plea of guilty to be withdrawn at any time before
56. Id. at 272, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
57. 4 A.D.2d 770, 165 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1957).
58. Id. at 771, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 342.
59. People v. Lee, 4 N.Y.2d 843, 173 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1958).
60. People v. Kingston, supra note 44 at 391, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
